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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
FISHERIES AGREEMENTS 
Current Situation and Perspectives INTRODUCTION 
The  Council  Resolution  of 3  November  1976
1  laid  the  foundation  for  the  conclusion  of 
fisheries  agreements.  After  twenty  years  of experience,  the  Commission  considers  it  is 
opportune to reflect on its external fisheries polic/. 
SEC..IION  I 
1.1  Developml'nt of the fisheries af!•·eements  1977-1996 
The Community's policy on fisheries agreements came into being orftcially with the Council 
Resolution of 3 November 1976 foreseeing the extension by Member States of their fishing 
zones  off  their  North  Atlantic  and  North  Sea  coasts  to  200  miles  with  effect  from 
I  January  1977. This decision was taken in order to protect Community interests in  the face 
of unilateral declarations by several countries extending their sovereignty to 200 miles from 
their coasts  which  threatened  to  interrupt  traditional  fisheries  by  Community  vessels.  The 
resolution stated, on  the one hand, that  fishing  by  third-country  vessels  in  fishing  grounds 
conducted within the 200-mile Community zone must be subject to agreements between the 
Community and the partner countries concerned, and, on the other hand, that the maintenance 
of existing fishing rights and the obtaining of new rights for Community fishermen in  third-
country  waters  should  be  determined  within  the  framework  of appropriate  Community 
fisheries agreements. 
This policy  on  fisheries  agreements  was  necessary  to  safeguard  an  important  part of the 
fisheries  sector which  ensures vital  economic activity  - and  therefore employment - in  the 
Community in general and, more particularly, in  the coastal regions mainly dependent on the 
fisheries  sector.  It  furthermore  contributes  significantly  to  ensuring  that  the  Community 
market is supplied with fish  products. 
The Community's fisheries agreements, initially confined to  the North  Sea, have since been 
extended to other waters.  At present, the Community has concluded 26 agreements,  15  with 
countries in  Africa and the Indian Ocean,  I 0 with North Atlantic countries including 5 in  the 
Baltic Sea, and one with a  Latin  American country. 
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This commumcation  is  complemented hy  the  Commission services  working document on  fishcncs 
agreements prepared for the European Parliament Seminar in Quimper on  11,/ I 'I  May  I')')(,_ 
2 Since their introduction,  there  has been  a  steady  evolution  in  the  nature  and  range of our 
fisheries agreements. The accession of ~1pain and Portugal  in  19UJ, 'Nith  their own network 
of fisheries ;1greements and that of Sweden and Finl<md later, provided ;m  important impetus 
to  the development of the Community's fisheries agreements. For those :1greement~; involving 
a  financial cost to the Community, the international fisheries agreement lnrtlget has cxpan(bl 
from 6 MECU in  19R I to 280 MECU in  19% ;md the corresponding fish in!', possibilities have 
increased  from  13  900 GRT  to  132  000  GRT (plus  the  additional  136  (J()(J  tons  quota  in 
Greenland). 
The Commission  has  furthermore  been  mandated  by  Council  to  negotiate new agreements 
with Latin American, African and other states
1
. 
1.2  Natnn· of tht•  acn·t•mt•nts 
Types of  fislwries agreement 
There is no single "agreement type".  Rather the nature of the individual agreements reflects 
the objectives and  economic  interests of the  respective  parties.  When  the  agreement  with 
Argentina involving the promotion of joint ventures and joint enterprises was concluded in 
May  1994, it  was considered a  "second generation agreement" and all  previously concluded 
agreements were termed "classical" or "first generation  af.~reements" 
The Community has concluded a range of different types of agreements with partner countries 
111  the context of its externaL fisheries policy.  They cover: 
the reciprocal agreements under which the Community offers partner countries fishing 
opportunities in  the waters of its Member States against equivalent opportunities for 
Community vessels in  their waters (Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland and the Baltic 
Republics); 
the agreements on access to surplus stocks for Community vessels to  fish  tn  the watL·rs 
of a  third country (United States
4
,  Canada\); 
the agreements on access to resources for Community vessels in exchange for financial 
compensation (ACP countries of Africa and the Indian Ocean, and Morocco in  certain 
respects); 
the agreement on access to  resources under licence and joint venture arrangements in 
return  for  financial  compensation and lnarket ;,ccess (Greenla11d) 
Mandates for  new agreements. 
l.at111  /\mer rca  Chile, l'eru, l·:..:uador, t'olomhra, Vent:/alt:la, 1  lraa,~ll.a\ 
/\frrca  (iabon, South Africa, Mo1.ambiquc, NamiiHa 
Other areas  Poland,  l~ussw and lJS/\ 
Expired at the end of I ')')1 
Canada has not  yl't  ratrficd the  I 'J'J2  1\~rL'L'Illt:lll and finally, the agreement with Argentina involving the constitution of  joint enterprises 
and joint ventures. 
Each of these models has its own distinct rationale and can be understood notably in relation 
to  historical  fishing  patterns  and  arrangements,  the  state  of development  of the  partner 
countries' fisheries sector or the presence of common fish stocks occuring in  the fishing zones 
of the Community and the third country. 
The Council's adoption of a  negotiating mandate for Latin American countries in  October 
1990 signalled the  first  major change in  the  Community's policy  on fisheries  agreements 
since it  sought to  take  account of the potential  commercial  possibilities  in  countries with 
already developed fisheries sectors. The main innovation in  this approach was that access to 
fishing  possibilities in  the waters of Latin  American countries would be based, not on  the 
granting of fishing licences by partner countries, but on the constitution of joint enterprises 
and joint ventures in  the fishing industry  between Community vessel  owners and the third 
country's fishing interests. 
1.3  Basic principles 
The fisheries agreements are negotiated in  accordance with the guidelines contained in  the 
negotiating  directives  decided  by  Council.  Their  negotiation  is  based  notably  on  the 
principles contained in  the UN Law of the Sea Convention and, in  the case of ACP States, 
also complies with the ACP/EC Convention.  Account is  taken of the rights and obligations 
of coastal states and those of the Community, and particularly the need for cooperation in  the 
international context.  A key objective pursued is to ensure the conservation and rational and 
sustainable use of the fisheries resources concerned. 
In  relation  to  the  fishing of stocks surplus to  the  requirements and harvesting capacity  of 
coastal states, the guiding tenet for the agreements are the relevant provisions of Article 62 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the ACP/EC Lome 
Convention. 
Fisheries agreements have been commercial in nature from the outset, namely, the provision 
of  fishing  opportunities  for  the  Community  fleet,  either  in  exchange  for  other  fishing 
possibilities for partner countries or the payment of financial  contributions.  However, this 
commercial character in  no way dissipates the Community's commitment to  the conservation 
of resources  in  the  waters of our partner  countries,  as  reflected  in  the  fishing  levels  and 
conditions, control arrangements etc.  foreseen  in  the agreements. · 
'  In  the case of ACP States, fisheries agreements are a specific clement of overall Community 
policy  towards  these  countries.  In  accordance  with  Article 130 V  of the  EC  Treaty,  this 
element has obviously  to  be  consistent with  the  Community's  development policy  as  laid 
down in  the ACPIEC Convention.  Therefore, whilst the objective of our agreements is  not 
to  develop  the  domestic  fishing  industry  of our  partner  country,  including  the  artisanal 
f1sheries, the Community nevertheless must ensure that the agreement docs not constrain their 
4 development or viability. 
However, the agreements with ACP countries have their own philosophy, which is not based 
on development objectives. The commercial concept in this case has to be understood as the 
definition of mutual concessions of both parties, in other words, ~ balance between what the 
Community receives in  terms of fishing  possibilities nnd  what it  pays to  the third countl)' 
concerned. 
The  global  compensation  consists  essentially  of  financial  contributions,  paid  by  the 
Community  and  by  the  shipowners  through  the  licence  fees,  but  also  by  "development 
minded"  actions,  supported  by  the shipowners, such  as  crewing by  nationals of the  ACP, 
landing obligations on catches, observers on board vessels, etc  ... , specifically requested by the 
third country during the negotiations. 
In  the context of a commercial transaction, the partner country is completely free to choose 
the final destination of the financial compensation of  the agreement. Usually, the vast majority 
of the compens:1tion is attributed to the Treasury with a part being devoted to specific actions 
in  the nation::l!  fishing sector, scientific research on stocks, training in the fisheries sector and 
inspection services etc.  The contribution of the scientific and training programmes in  most 
of the partner countries has enabled them to train or retrain a large number of their nationals 
in  various  areas of the  fishing  sector,  as  fishermen,  observers,  scientists,  economists  rmd 
engineers for the processing industry.  A welcomed development in relation to the altribution 
of funds is that the new Agreement with rvtorocco  foresees 30% of the total financing being 
devoted over the four years of the Agreement to the development of the Moroccan fisheries 
sector. 
Increased emphasis is now being given in  the Agreements to promoting effective control on 
the  fishing  activities  through  observer  and  inspection  programmes,  the  financing  of the 
inspection infrastructure in our partner countries and the establishment in  the Member States 
of specific inspection programmes for  vessels fishing  under the agreements. 
5 SECTION II 
:lOLlS OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS 
Overn11 objectives 
The objectives laid down for the fisheries agreements in the negotiating directives adopted by 
Council have ensured a  key role for the fisheries agreements in  the Community's Common 
Fisheries Policy.  These objectives relate  particularly to  the direct and indirect employment 
related to the fishing activities, the level and stability of fishing opportunities provided for the 
Community  fleet;  the  fish  and  fish  products  from  Community  sources  supplied  to  the 
Community market and the agreements role in the Community's structural policy for its fleet. 
2.1  Sodo-cconnmic nspects 
One of the  principal  raisons  d'etre  for  these  agreements  remains  social  and  economic in 
nature.  By maintaining or expanding fishing possibilities for the fleet in third country waters, 
the  agreements  protect  the  level  of direct  employment  on  fishing  vessels  and  indirect 
employment in  on-shore processing facilities  and related industries within the Community. 
Consequently, the continued existence of  these agreements is vital for the coastal communities 
dependent on  our  fisheries  sector as  these  C?mmunities  arc  generally  situated  in  regions 
economically disadvantaged where there arc few, if any, alternative employment opportunities. 
An estimated 20 000 persons from  the Community arc directly  employed on  1.300 fishing 
vessels  operating  under  our  fisheries  agreements.  Conservatively,  and  based  on  socio-
economic regional studies, it is estimated that one sea-based job generates one land-based job. 
Therefore, a  further  20 000 persons arc  employed in  the fishing  industry and the ancillary 
services  directly  related  to  these  agreements.  This  dimension  is  best  illustrated  by  the 
agreement  with  Morocco  which  accounts,  by  itself,  for  over  8 000 fishermen  directly 
employed on the vessels. 
The creation and/or maintenance of employment associated with  the fisheries agreements is 
not confined to the Community, since these agreements also generate employment possibilities 
in  the fishing sectors of our ACP partner countries.  The agreements foresee the recruitment 
of local  fishermen  on  our fishing  vessels  with  the  number  depending  on  the  size of the 
vessels.  Observers are  also  placed on  board  and  the  need  for  repairs,  supplies  and other 
services for our vessels creates further jobs ill, our partner's ports.  The research institutes and 
inspection services of our partners also benefit· from additional employment directly resulting 
from  the operation of the agreements.  Where the agreements foresee obligatory landing by 
Community  vessels  in  our  partner  countries  they  contribute  to  employment  in  the  fish 
processing industries in  those countries. 
6 A further important objective of the Community'~ agreement::: is the supp!y of fish products 
to the Community mmket from Comr.mnity sources. The Com1mmity market constitutes the 
largest fish  market in the world \Vith  over 9  million tons in  1993. Ill  thnt year, the vr,luc of 
imports wr:...s  7 billion ECU :2nd,  i.n  quantitative terms, 3.G  million  tor~s. In value tcmlf·, tllis 
cKcccdcd the production vvithin the Community which rc<:·chcd 6  billion ECU for 6.7 million 
tons. 
In this context, it  is  impofir,!tt to utilise  n..11d  develop the instruments which \?ill ensure r:wt 
the  supply  to  the  Community  m~d:ct  from  Community  sources  mnintnins  its  reb~ivc 
importance.  The  fisheries  ~grc~cments,  when  combined  v.'ith  catches  by  our  vessels  in 
intcrnationrr!  w~tcrs, contribute nppro:dmntccly  25% of the Community's overall  production. 
Therefore, the)' constitute <m  import2nt vehicle to ensure the supply to the Community rn;ukd 
and reduce our trndc deficit in  fisheries prociucts. 
It should be noted that this deficit has increased erer,tly in  recent years, pr.r!icularly bctv:c:en 
19!W  and  1990, and now is  equiv~lcnt to  54% of vduc in  t-:;rms  of om rnartc1  nc,~cls. This 
trend can be explained by the exprrnsion in  the m~•rket itself due lo the ::ccc~;sion 0f  ~~·p:::in ::nd 
Portug~! in  l9E6 :!nd the strong growth in  the (kmand for fisheries products wltieh h[:5  ~:c::e:1 
per eapit:::.  consumption rise from  l 5  kr:;  to  22  kg in  the period  1983-90. 
Our fish proccssinz industry employs ll 0 000 persons working in  2  500 to 3  000 cmnp:mie~;. 
The  issue  of supply  to  the  Community· market  from  Community  sources  is  signilfc:ml 
therefore in order to  avoid over-dependence on  imports from  third  country  sources rc,r  thC; 
supply of raw materials  . 
. The Community, through its fisheries r.nd  development policies, hn;;  unibfcra!Iy put in  pLtcc. 
special  preferential regimes for imports of fish  products from  ACP  cc'luntrie~:, Morocco :end 
Greenland.  These concessions gr::..rtt considerable market adv<mtagc to cert:.:in o? cur ii::hcrie~: 
partners as fish products from ACP countries enter the Community market dtny·-frcc: <::!r:;  ncc:::l 
Morocc2n  fish  products benefit from  a similar advantage.  In  addition, in  drc c:.::n!c:r.t  of ihcc 
agreement~ with  Argentin2  ;md  Greenland,  tariff  concessions  were  granted  on  il:::hr:ry 
products of interest to  those countries but these are erga omnes in  nature.  H(iv·n·r:·t·, \,·:til  !lH; 
progressive dismantling of the  '.\'Orld's  tariff barriers  following  the  Urugu<ty  n:ound,  v·nrld 
markets will become increasingly more open and foreign competitors will  be sb!c :o co:npc·tc 
in  the Community market, with  a level  of costs in  some cases well  bctow their Cerm;wnil:; 
counterparts. 
Certain of the fisheries agreements foresee voluntary or compulsory landines nf c~;tcJ,r.:~;  by 
Community vessels in the ports of the.  countries where the Community fleet is  oper:::tir~g. Both 
compulsory and voluntary  landings promote increased economic activity in  these colmtrics. 
In addition, there are landings ofhigh-quality species which may be used either for rroccssi:>g 
and subsequent export. or supply to the local  market. 
7 2.3  Fisheries resources 
A joint commitment to the conservation and rational management of the fisheries constitutes 
a key  element of the agreements.  In conformity with international law and UNCLOS, it is 
the partner country and not the Community which determines the existence of surplus stocks 
and  which  consequently decides the level  of fishing  possibilities on offer and the fishing 
conditions accorded to the different fleets, including the Community fleet.  The appreciation 
of the status of the stocks is  the responsibility of the coastal  state and since our fisheries 
agreements actively encourage research on the stocks, negotiations for the renewal of  fisheries 
agreements are based on  research data often  collected under programmes financed  by  the 
Community.  In recent years, when catch rates have demonstrated problems with specific fish 
stocks in  certain agreements, the Community has unilaterally sought reductions in its fishing 
possibilities in order to safeguard those stocks. 
The  fishing  zones  within  which  the  Community  fleet  operate  arc  designed  to  exclude 
interference with the artisanal fisheries of the countries in question and where a country has 
an  industrial  fishing  fleet,  the level of fishing possibilities offered to  the Community takes 
account of their needs.  However, most of the ACP countries with which the Community has 
fishing agreements do not possess a significant domestic industrial fleet.  Consequently, the 
Community's fisheries are harvesting resources which might otherwise remain unexploited or 
would  be  fished,  often  illegally,  by  vessels  from  other  countries;  in  either  case  with  no 
advantage to  the ACP country. 
The Community fleet's presence, in  contrast to  the presence of vessels from non-Community 
countries, is well  regulated and in  ACP countries, defined under clear licensing procedures, 
with  measures for  the  control  of our  fleet's  ~ctivities;  the  placement  of observers on  the 
vessels;  inspections at sea and in  port.  Community vessels are obliged to  comply  with the 
technical conditions laid down in the Agreements in relation, inter alia, to  authorised fishing 
zones, gear and mesh sizes. 
The Commission has increasingly targeted the implementation of measures both in the waters 
of our ACP partner countries and within the Community, to ensure that the conservation and 
technical measures carefully elaborated in the negotiations are adhered to by  the Community 
vessels concerned.  To that end, there is  fmancing available under the agreements to  enable 
the third country to strengthen its inspection services and new control systems (satellite) will 
permit increased and more accurate surveillance.  This instrument, linked with the observers 
on  board  the  vessels,  should  significantly  improve  control  systems.  Equally,  specific 
inspection programmes targeting the vessels operating under certain  agreements have been 
developed by the Member States and·an administrative cooperation has been established with 
the inspection services of the partner countries. 
8 2,_,  !Hilisntion of  fis:u~r!er, n11reemen ts 
Fisheries ncrecments are negotiated in order to  provide potential access for the Community 
fleet  to  the  waters of a  range of countries.  The  level  of utilisation  will  vary  from  one 
agreement  to  another  and  this  aspect  can  be  considered  from  two  different  perspectives, 
namely, fishing possibilities and catch levels. 
The  fishing  possibilities  fixed  in  a  given aereement depend on  many  factors,  notably  the 
fisheries policies of our partners, the state of the resources and the  opportunitic~ sought by 
Member States for their vessels.  The appreciation of the level of utilisation of these fishinr; 
possibilities, should take account of the target species of the fleets concerned. There arc two 
different situations in this regard. Firstly, fishing possibilities for tuna and sworJfisl: arc fi~:cd 
by  reference  to  the  number of fishing  vessels  authorised  to  fish.  In  view  of the  highly 
migratory nature of these species, vessel owners normally request licences to be able t.o  fish 
throughout  the  migratory  range of the  species.  In  contrast,  demersal  fisheries  under  the 
agreements arc based on a different parameter, namely, the level of  authorised gross registered 
tonnage of Community vessels in  our partner's waters at  a given time. 
It will  be ;,ppreciated that the utilisation of fishing possibilities will  vary over the life-time 
of the agreement  depending on numerous factors such as the level of licence fees, catch rates, 
market prices for the species, climatic and sea conditions, etc. It should be noted th<1t  Member 
States and shipovmers incur no penalty if they do not fully utilise the  fishiq~ possibilities on 
offer during the lifetime of an  agreement, particularly since shipowners usuaily pay for their 
licences on a quarterly basis. 
The  second  consideration  relates  to  the  level  of catches  by  Community  vessels  operating 
under the fisheries agreements. The Commission sought for many years to cnduce Member 
States  to  communicate  the  catches  of their  vessels  operating  in  the  waters  of countries, 
particularly  ACP  countries,  with  which  the  Community  had  an  agreement.  In  1927,  the 
Commission adopted a  Regulation (3151/87) to that effect. This Regulation was annulled by 
the Court of Justice in  1989. It was not until  1993  that a new control  Regulation (2847/93) 
obliged Member States to exercise control over the fishing activities of their vessels, notably 
in  partner countries.  This  means  that  data on  these  activities  on  a  regular  basis  has  only 
become available in  recent years and the Commission considers that further improvement is 
needed in  relation to  the accuracy  and regularity of catch  reporting by  Community vessels 
operating under such agreements. 
The situation in  relation to the tuna catches by our fleet is different since they have a scp;:rate 
catch reporting system due to the fact that their fisheries arc carried out both in  international 
waters  and  in  the  waters of partner  countries  as  they  follow  the  migratory  range of the 
species.  Each tuna fishing vessel completes e  daily catch form  which is  then transmitted to 
the national scientific institute of  the Member State of the vessel concerned.  The Commission 
receives an  annual statement. of catches for each  vessel.  It  is  on the basis of this statement 
that the financial payments arc made to partner countries for that portion of the catch of the 
vessel  taken in  its waters.· 
9 2.5  Fishinz. neets 
Fishing activities  in  third country  waters under the agreements contribute to  reducing the 
fishing pressure on stocks in Community waters.  There arc 1 000 vessels engaged in fisheries 
under the Morocco and ACP agreements and a further 300 vessels arc present on average in 
the other agreements with  Norway, Greenland, etc.  The presence over many years of the 
Community fleet in the waters of partner countries under the first-generation agreements, has 
demonstrated to the latter the development potential for  their own fishing  fleets to  harvest 
their  resources;  thus  a  transfer  of  know-how  and  experience.  This  development  has 
sometimes led to a reduction in the fishing opportunities available to the Community fleet in 
certain waters. 
The  second-generation  agreements  involving  the  creation  of joint  enterprises  and  joint 
ventures have implications on the Community's structural policy for its fleet.  In the·  case of 
joint enterprises fishing vessels are transferred definitively from  the Community fleet to  the 
fleets of the partner countries concerned. Under such arrangements, our partners modernise 
their fishing fleets and there is  a corresponding reduction in  the Community fleet.  Where 
a joint enterprise is  created, targeting non-surplus stocks, the Community vessel  transferred 
replaces an  existing vessel in  the fisheries,  with no increase in  fishing effort. 
In general under the agr'eements with ACP countries, Community vessels are being accorded 
access  to  resources  which  are surplus fo  the  harvesting capacity  of the domestic  fleet  and 
otherwise would  remain either uncxploited or would be exploited by  competing high  seas 
fleets, notably Asiatic. 
Of course, the fleets of many of the  world's developed fishing  nations arc characterised by 
the  phenomenon  of over-capacity  i.e.  too  many  vessels  compared  to  available  fisheries 
resources.  Efforts are being made to reduce the size of these fleets and no doubt this process, 
not  only  in  the Community  but on  a  worldwide basis,  will  continue.  This excess fishing 
capacity  threatens  the  long  term  sustainable  exploitation  of the  stocks  and  creates  major 
problems for  the economic viability of the fleets.  The future  development of the  fisheries 
sector is  dependent on  a  reduction  in  fleet sizes to  a  level  where the level of fishing  effort 
corresponds, at  the most, to the maximum sustainable yield of the fisheries  resources.  This 
trend allied to the expansion in  the fleets of certain developing countries, has implications for 
the Community's fisheries policy and for the fisheries agreements. 
10 SECTION Ill 
Perspectives 
A  new international  legal  framework is emerging in  world fisheries consisting of the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the U.N. Agreement on straddling fish  stocks and highly 
migratory  fish  stocks and  the  non-legally  binding F AO  Code of Conduct for  responsible 
fisheries.  Since  the  Community  has  been  a  major  participant  during  the  process of the 
elaboration of the above-mentioned instruments, it therefore needs, as a  responsible fishing 
entity, to  be active and constructive at the implementation stage as well. 
The Community's fisheries agreements cannot remain indifferent to these developments.  This 
instrument, which has been a  key part of the Common fisheries Policy must be capable of 
adjustment to the new international realities and legal order.  The fishing sector will continue 
to  be  under  close  public  scrutiny  and  the  fisheries  agreements  will  not  escape  from  this 
process.  These  agreements  must  be,  and  be  seen  to  be,  responsible  in  terms  of fishing 
practices and balanced in  the interests of both parties. 
However, different factors will  influence the future course of the fisheries agreements. 
Firstly,  the  level  of available  budgetary  appropriations  will  constitute  a  key  clement  in 
determining how the policy will  evolve.  The current budgetary situation is that the costs of 
existing agreements leave little margin for the negotiation of new agreements and indeed may 
compromise  the  re-negotiation  of  others  in  the  future.  Secondly,  new  international 
management guidelines and strategies, in  the  pursuit of the goal of sustainable exploitation 
of fisheries  resources,  as  well  as  the  development of their domestic  fishing  sectors (fleet, 
processing facilities and ports) by our partners may lead to a reduction in fishing possibilities 
available for the Community fleet. 
The  Commission  considers  that  the  policy  to  be  pursued  in  the short  to  medium  term  in 
relation to fisheries agreements needs to be differentiated according to the contrasting fisheries 
situations surrounding the current agreements. 
Jn  the first instance, those agreements involving reciprocal exchange of quotas, and in  certain 
situations joint management of stocks, arc a key  clement of the management of the CFP.  Jn 
view of this and the fact that the exchange of quotas arc balanced, the Commission considers 
that these agreements should be maintained. 
In  the  second  instance,  and  in  regnrd  to  thl{  possible  conclusion  of agreements  with  new 
partner countries, the Commission is  of the view that, in  the mnin, such agreements will  be 
hased  on  the  2nd generation  mode!  involving  the  promotion of joint enterprises nncl  joint 
ventures and dcp(;nding on the mutual interests of both  P~rtics, this approach could als8 npply 
to  the  eventual  renewal  of  existing  agreements.  The  agreement  \vitll  Argentina  has 
demonstrated the r..ttractiveness of the 2nd generation model, in particular for partner countries 
with established fishing industries as  in  Latin America, the southcrn_part of Africa and New 
II Zc3l:!.nd.  This  emphasi!>  on  a  partnership  appror.ch  between  the  Community  and  partner 
countries,  which is not limited purely to  the exploitation or extraction  phase, constitutes a 
recognition that n viable long-term mutually beneficial fisheries relationship may be based on 
a closer integration of the respective fisheries sectors. 
Finally, there are those agreements involving a financial cost to the Community, notably those 
with Morocco, Greenland and the ACP States.  The political, social and economic significance 
and impact for the Community of these agreements in terms of employment, market supply 
etc.  has already been illustrated in  Section II. 
The budgetary situation applicable to fisheries agreements under the CFP nevertheless imposes 
new conditions in  respect of the conclusion of new agreements, as  also  in  respect of the 
renewal of existing agreements.  The financial  reality is that certain agreements could now 
be allowed to lapse in  the interests of concentrating the Community's financial  resources on. 
improving those agreements considered to  be most attractive to  Community shipowners. 
The level of utilisation of the agreements, in  terms of licences obtained by shipowners is an 
interesting  indicator  in  this  regard.  It  also  demonstrates  that  certain  agreements, 
systematically  under-used  to  a  very  large  extent,  are  of limited  interest  for  Community 
fishermen. 
Hence, in the short or medium term, the Community should consider several options. 
(a)  Speed up a reduction of the Community fleet operating in non-Community waters. 
Such action would require the means to  absorb the fleet concerned, which could not be 
abandoned to its fate.  It would therefore call for additional financial resources to those 
already planned by  way of structural adjustment in  order to  encourage the conversion 
or scrapping of vessels and to  lessen the risk of vessels returning to Community waters 
at a time when the present overcapacity in  such waters must be eliminated. 
Furthermore, such a  reduction would certainly involve greater dependence on the part 
of the Community for its supply of fishery  products - currently over. 54% - and would 
have a  very  considerable adverse  impact on employment, particularly  in  the  already 
seriously affected coastal  regions of the Community dependent on fisheries. 
(b)  Renounce those agreements that are least attractive to  the industry as  a whole. 
Initially  certain agreements could fall  within  this category  and eventual  savings from 
these agreements could be switched to other agreements from which a higher economic 
and social  return may be derived.  However, this analysis may not ignore certain non-
quantifiable factors, and notably the nature of the relationship between the Community 
and the  third  countries concerned or even  the coherence of our policy  regarding  the 
management and control of the fishing activities of distant-water Community  fishing 
vessels. 
12 (c)  Concentrate  fin~ncial resources on  the  most  nttr~ctive nereemcnts 
This option, which adopts the line set out immediately above, would involve negotiating 
the finwcid  component of those  agreements  awaiting  renewal  in  order to  rm.tch  it 
squarely with the true interests of the sector.  This would signify that the Community's 
financial  obligations  under  future  agreements  would  be  limited  to  the  financial 
compensation component,  excluding thereby  the financing of all  other actions.  The 
intended effect  would therefore be also  to  redistribute existing budgetary  resources, 
concentrating them on those current or future  agreements which offer the maximum 
potential. 
d)  To modify the current repartition of costs of the fisheries agreements. 
Currently,  the  Community  assumes  the  major  share  of the  cost  of the  Fisheries 
Agreements.  This option  would entail  the  vessel  owners and/or the Member States 
assuming a  greater share of the current cost of the agreements.  This adjustment,  in 
addition to the financial  implications, could also have the effect of improving the rate 
of utilisation of certain fisheries agreements. 
13 